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Chapter 1
Privatization in China
Overview
Commencing its shift to a market economy 
in the late 1970s, China made a unique ap-
proach which is distinct from other transi-
tional economies in Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR. China proceeded with the in-
troduction of the market economy system 
progressively while upholding the socialist 
principle of public ownership of means of 
production. Consequently, China achieved 
high economic growth of 9% a year over the 
20 years of its reform and open-door polices, 
with the "success" of the Chinese-style gradu-
alistic reform drawing keen global attention.
In reality, however, the public ownership 
of capital, the offi cially-claimed essential tenet 
of China's economic reform, has been hol-
lowed out, if anything, by the very "success" of 
the graduaristic reform. A growing number 
of state-owned enterprises lost out in market 
competition with emerging village and town-
ship enterprises, private businesses and for-
eign-affi liated companies which emerged un-
der economic liberalization and open-door 
policy, with the weight of the state-owned sec-
tor in the industrial sector declining steadily. 
A small bunch of state-owned enterprises were 
relatively successful in adapting to the market 
economy, while, more often than not, fl aws in 
corporate governance structure of those en-
terprises has caused serious instability in their 
management.1
Against this background, moves toward 
the privatization of state-owned and collec-
tive enterprises began to get into full swing 
in China in the latter half of the 1990s. Priva-
tization, which at the earliest stage fi nancial-
ly pressed local governments started on their 
own initiative, gradually expanded its reach. 
From 1999 to 2001, the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (CPC) ef-
fectively gave the go-ahead to privatization 
moves, and privatization of large-scale state-
owned and collective enterprises also got un-
der way by making use of stock markets. Al-
though the term "privatization" has yet to be 
used offi cially, but China's policy, in reality, is 
now moving into the direction of concentrat-
ing state capital on a handful of enterprises of 
strategic importance, while privatizing a vast 
majority of other state-owned and collective 
enterprises.
1.1 Subject of Analysis 
The privatization of public enterpris-
es in China is the new development that only 
in recent years started to move into high gear. 
Due in part to China's circumstances where 
the term "privatization" still is something to 
be avoided, there is no publicized material 
yet that offers a comprehensive overview of 
privatization in China.2 This report relies pri-
marily on case studies to describe the prog-
ress being made in the privatization of a vari-
ety of Chinese enterprises, thereby making it 
possible to grasp an overall picture of the on-
going process of privatization. In addition to 
state-owned enterprises, this report also re-
fers occasionary to the privatization of urban 
collective enterprises, which come under ju-
risdiction of local governments and beset 
with problems basically akin to those at state-
owned enterprises.
Privatization in general can be ad-
dressed as a two-stage approach (Figure 1). In 
the fi rst stage, state-owned or collective enter-
prises are reorganized into joint stock com-
panies (including pricvate limited companies 
and joint stock cooperatives). At this stage, 
the government either still controls all or a 
majority of capital, or at least remains as the 
largest equity holder (semi-privatization). In 
the second stage, all or most of the govern-
ment's equity stake is sold off, leading to the 
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"genuine" privatization in the sense that pri-
vate-sector entities control capital (full priva-
tization). Either case of these privatization 
steps involves legal changes in the form of 
business organizations or equity participants. 
Thus, they should be called "de jure privatiza-
tion." For small and medium enterprises, full 
privatization in a single step is common, but 
the privatization of large enterprises usually 
proceeds in two stages.
In China ahead of the advent of the "de 
jure privatization," the authority over manage-
ment had been gradually transferred from the 
government sector to enterprises since the 
1980s, when economic reform was launched. 
With the acceleration of transition toward a 
market economy in the 1990s, autonomy of 
corporate management was further expand-
ed, and in some cases, managers came to ex-
ercise almost complete control over manage-
ment. The gradual process of the transfer of 
management authority from the government 
to corporate managers can be interpreted as 
"de facto privatization." There are not a few in-
stances where "de facto privatization" provides 
impetus toward "de jure privatization." For this 
Figure 1 Two Stages of Privatization
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Notes: Small and medium public enterprises are usually privatized directly without going through the semi-privatization stage.
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reason, this paper takes "de facto privatization" 
into its perspective as the stage preliminary to 
"de jure privatization," and analyzes the privati-
zation in a broader sense.
Below, this chapter gives an overview of 
the overall trend of privatization in China as 
the starting point for discussions in the fol-
lowing chapters.
1.2 Momentum toward Privatization
Until the early part of the 1990s, China's state-
owned enterprises had been placed under 
the strong infl uence of administrative author-
ities that had jurisdiction over industries. Lo-
cal governments, given strong incentives to 
increase revenue in the wake of fi scal reform 
in the 1980s, encouraged enterprises under 
their control to expand investment and pro-
duction. By that time, enterprises were also 
strongly motivated to pursue profi tability as a 
result of enterprise reform that gave a great-
er share in profi ts to them. Aggressive invest-
ment and the expansion of production activ-
ities at the initiatives of governments served 
as a booster to China's high economic growth 
through the early 1990s.
However, this system had the crucial 
weakness in the lack of self-responsibility for 
investment decisions. While both the govern-
ment sector and enterprises had the strong 
incentives to expand investment, not infre-
quently, no one took any responsibility for in-
vestment failures. Enterprises were bailed out 
with loans from state-owned banks. Thus, as 
the scale of business operations grew, invest-
ment effi ciency declined considerably, giving 
rise to serious overcapacity problems in in-
dustry areas where heavy investment concen-
trated. The unusual expansion of investment 
seen from the latter half of the 1980s through 
the early years of the 1990s gave rise to the se-
rious macroeconomic instability.
In the 1990s, meanwhile, foreign-af-
fi liated companies and private enterprises 
emerged as powerful competitors. With the 
gigantic vacuum of the markets created in the 
early period of China's economic reform all 
but fi lled and the general shortage of goods 
eliminated, the Chinese economy gradually 
but increasingly came to show signs of mak-
ing the transition from a sellers' market to a 
buyers' market. Amid the mounting pressures 
of competition, state-owned and public en-
terprises saw their profi tability decline signif-
icantly (see Figure 2).
Diffi culties surfaced fi rst at small and 
medium state-owned and collective enterpris-
es under the aegis of counties (xian) and dis-
tricts (qu). These uncompetitive enterprises 
were no match for up-and-coming village and 
township enterprises in many aspects includ-
ing cost and management fl exibility. Thus, 
management of small and medium state-
owned and collective enterprises deteriorated 
remarkably already in the early 1990s. Man-
agement diffi culties at these enterprises dealt 
a serious blow to the fi nances of local govern-
ments that relied heavily on tax receipts from 
them.
Confronted with the fragile fi scal situ-
ation, some county and district governments 
resorted to the ultimate choice, divestiture of 
enterprises under their control. This marked 
the start of the sell-off of small and medium 
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state-owned and collective enterprises in some 
regions in the fi rst half of the 1990s. This de-
velopment effectively opened the way for the 
privatization of public enterprises in China 
(see Table 1).
1.3 Inching toward Establishment of 
Privatization Policy
It was not that the central government 
was unaware of the crisis situation of small 
and medium state-owned enterprises. Indeed, 
in the early 1990s, the central government 
was evidently aware of the need to substan-
tially curtail the number and distribution of 
state-owned enterprises and narrow the scope 
of enterprises to support.
At the third Plenum of the 14th Central 
Committee of the CPC, held in September 
1993, the party leadership put forward the 
policy of seeking a socialist market economy, 
effectively breaking away from the planned 
economy and embarking on the road to a full 
market economy. The party decision at the 
plenum, as part of reform of state-owned en-
terprises, allowed a host of ways of reform, 
ranging from the reorganization of small and 
medium state-owned enterprises into joint 
stock cooperatives to privatization-orient-
ed methods such as the sale of those enter-
prises to corporate entities and individuals. 
This decision had in fact set the basic tent of 
corporate reform, which eventually led Chi-
na to embrace the present privatization poli-
cy in more recent years. Furthermore, under 
the "Grasp the large and liberalize the small 
(Zhua da fang xiao)" policy set out from 1995 
to 1996, China encouraged an overhaul of 
small and medium enterprises with the slogan 
"Liberalize and vitalize (Fangkai fanghuo)." 
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But conservative forces within the CPC and 
ideologues that support them put up strong 
opposition to the line of policy, causing heat-
ed debate over the "Grasp the large and liber-
alize the small" policy.
The speech by General Secretary Jiang 
Zemin at the 15th Party Congress in Septem-
ber 1997 marked a major turning point for 
the full-fl edged privatization policy. The Ji-
ang speech offered the broad defi nition that 
public ownership includes state capital and 
public capital in the mixed ownership system, 
and put forward the policy of "strategic ad-
justment of the state economy" under which 
the central government reinforces its control 
over the overall economy by concentrating 
state capital on a few core areas of the nation-
al economy. This effectively reaffi rmed the le-
gitimacy of the "Grasp the large and liberal-
ize the small" policy, and meant that the party 
leadership has authorized the promotion of 
full privatization in non-core industries. 
Even after the 15th Party Congress, the 
dispute dragged on between the reform-
ist and conservative camps over the interpre-
tation of the Jiang speech. Things began to 
move already, however. Interpreting the Ji-
ang speech as the green light for privatiza-
tion, local governments started to sell small 
and medium state-owned and collective enter-
prises aggressively. The overly rapid spread of 
the sell-off of small and medium enterprises 
alarmed the State Economic and Trade Com-
mission, prompting it to issue a notice in July 
1998 seeking to put the brake on the fren-
zied sale of enterprises by local governments.4 
But this episode had little impact on the over-
all situation. At the fourth Plenum of the 15th 
Central Committee of the CPC, held in Sep-
tember 1999 as the fi rst meeting in the CPC's 
history devoted solely to the single agenda of 
the problem of state-owned enterprises, the 
decision was taken to reaffi rm the policy of 
"strategic adjustment of the state economy."5
This decision effectively established the poli-
cy for the privatization of state-owned and col-
lective enterprises in non-core industries as 
the party leadership's policy, largely eliminat-
ing political constraints over privatization.6
The removal of the political constraints 
helped substantially expand the scope of en-
terprises subject to privatization from late 
1999 onward. Since the fourth Plenum, not 
only counties, which led the early phase of 
privatization in China, but also major cit-
ies successively announced their intention of 
pushing for the "exit of state-owned capital" 
from non-core industries, irrespective of the 
size of enterprises concerned. Privatization 
seems to have made a considerable headway 
for small and medium enterprises, which usu-
ally are relatively easy to sell off (see Chapter 
2).
The wave of privatization began to 
spread to large enterprises as well. There have 
emerged some moves for the sale of relatively 
large state-owned enterprises under the juris-
diction of local governments to their manag-
ers or collective management. In recent years, 
the central government has been pushing for 
stock listings of large state-owned enterpris-
es. In most cases, however, the government or 
parent state-owned enterprises remain as the 
top shareholders in listed companies, large-
ly undermining the effectiveness of stock mar-
ket as a vehicle of corporate governance. Fol-
lowing the decision at the fourth Plenum to 
lower the ratio of state shares in listed compa-
nies, an experimental measure for the dispos-
al of state shares was put into force in 2001 
(see Chapter 5).
It is evidently impossible to complete 
the privatization of large enterprises in a 
short space of time, even in the context of 
only technical aspects, such as how to deal 
with surplus labor or how to identify potential 
purchasers. Against all odds, however, China's 
current policy for privatization is steadily mov-
ing toward the gradualistic privatization of 
large state-owned enterprises.
1.4 Changes in the Environment 
It took almost fi ve years before the basic 
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policy of corporate reform, laid out by the de-
cision at the third Plenum of the 14th Central 
Committee of the CPC, evolved into the pol-
icy for full privatization by overcoming ideo-
logical opposition and wariness about politi-
cal backlash. The changes in the environment 
that took place during those years certainly 
helped the privatization policy take fi rm root 
in China.
Previously, the governments of all lev-
els regarded state-owned and collective enter-
prises under their control as the tools to re-
alize policy objectives such as increasing tax 
revenue, enhancing employment effective-
ness and promoting industrial development. 
However, the effectiveness of state-owned and 
collective enterprises as the policy tools ap-
parently declined7 as market competition in-
tensifi ed and fi nancial performance of a ma-
jority of them deteriorated as a whole in the 
1990s.
On the other hand, private-sector com-
panies and foreign-affi liated fi rms, which 
were only beginning to open their buds in 
the 1980s, achieved rapid growth particular-
ly in the Coastal Region in the 1990s. People 
could realize the outcome of market competi-
tion through the improvements of goods and 
services in terms of both quantity and qual-
ity, and were beginning to show confi dence 
in the effi ciency of the market system. At the 
same time, in regions where transition to a 
market economy has made greater way, the 
view was beginning to take root among lo-
cal governments that development of an envi-
ronment conducive to growth of private-sec-
tor companies and foreign-affi liated fi rms is a 
more effi cient way of achieving policy objec-
tives than pouring limited resources into inef-
fi cient state-owned and collective enterprises.8
Amid this sea change in the environ-
ment, China's leadership came to believe 
that it would be imperative to make its econ-
omy more effi cient ahead of accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and that it 
would be inevitable to sell off state-owned cap-
ital in order to avoid fi scal crisis of the central 
government. This awareness provided the im-
mediate impetus for the CPC leadership to ef-
fectively embark on the promotion of privati-
zation from 1997 onward.
1.5 Direction of Privatization
The enterprise system reform in Chi-
na has been undertaken by the trial-and-er-
ror method, as with the case of economic 
reform in other areas. The privatization pol-
icy, too, was born out of this process of trials 
and errors. Even now, after the privatization 
of a great majority of state-owned and collec-
tive enterprises has become a well-established 
course of action, China's central government 
has not yet come up with a clear policy that 
defi nes the methods, scope and timetable of 
privatization. Nevertheless, in reality, the en-
terprise system reform, including privatiza-
tion, appears to be heading for several clearer 
directions according to differences in the size 
of enterprises and political signifi cance.
Convergence of Ownership and Management 
Privatization of small and medium en-
terprises in its early stage mostly took the 
form of the shift of ownership to employees, 
including joint stock cooperatives. But the 
egalitarian distribution of equity ownership by 
employees often hampers effi ciency in mak-
ing decisions. The awareness of this down side 
prompted moves to encourage the concentra-
tion of capital ownership in the hands of ex-
ecutive managers. Not limited to small and 
medium enterprises, the number of acquisi-
tions led by corporate executives is now in-
creasing for middle-standing enterprises with 
relatively large capital. Together with acquisi-
tions by outside companies, small and medi-
um enterprises as well as middle-standing en-
terprises are now increasingly moving toward 
the convergence of ownership and manage-
ment. Chapter 2 of this report analyzes the 
rapidly-paced privatization of small and me-
dium state-owned enterprises and urban pub-
lic enterprises in the latter half of the 1990s 
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by focusing on the concentration of capital in 
the hands of corporate managers and man-
agement executives. Chapter 3, based on case 
studies, analyzes the evolution of emerging 
large state-owned enterprises that attempted 
to break from the de-facto control by manag-
ers in favor of "genuine" privatization.
Corporate Governance through Stock Markets 
It is often diffi cult to privatize large en-
terprises at a brush. In a period of transition 
to full privatization, therefore, there is the 
stage of mixed ownership where both the gov-
ernment and private sectors get involved in 
corporate governance. Chapter 4 of this re-
port looks at the dynamics of corporate gover-
nance at large public enterprises with mixed 
ownership, while Chapter 5 examines recent 
privatization initiatives that is unfolding on 
the stock markets.
Privatization itself, needless to say, is a 
transitional phenomenon. What is really im-
portant is not privatization per se, which 
should come to an end in the not-so-distant 
future. What we have the greatest interest in 
is how China's enterprise system is going to 
evolve through privatization, and how that 
evolution is going to infl uence China's eco-
nomic system as well as its political and social 
systems. We present a measure of vision on 
these issues in the last chapter.
(Ken-ichi IMAI)
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